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SHIFTING OF INCOME WITHIN THE FAMILY: 
WILL 1986 I.R.C. CHANGES BRING 
SIGNIFICANT REFORM? 
John A. Lynch, Jr.* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In challenging Congress and the citizenry to embrace tax reform, 
President Reagan stated: 
While most Americans labor under excessively high tax rates that dis-
courage work and cut drastically into savings, many are able to exploit 
the tangled mass of loopholes that has grown up around our tax code to 
avoid paying their fair share-sometimes to avoid paying any taxes at 
all. 1 
Fairness and simplicity were clearly overriding objectives of the tax re-
form movement that culminated in the Tax Reform Act of 1986.1 
From the perspectives of both fairness and simplicity, one of the 
most egregious features of prior law was the ability of taxpayers with 
accumulated wealth to thwart the effects of the progressive taxation by 
shifting income from such accumulated wealth from the accumulator 
of such wealth to family members in lower tax brackets. Often, such 
shifting of income has been accomplished through the use of trusts, 
which since the earliest days of federal income taxation have been rec-
ognized as separate taxpayers.3 
• Professor of Law, University of Baltimore School of Law. A.B., St. Anselm's College 
(1971); J.D. & LL.M., George Washington University (1974 & 1978). 
I. Pt:esident's Message to Congress Transmitting Proposed Tax Reform Legislation, 21 
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 707-08 (June 3, 1985). 
2. Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085. 
3. See Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 271, § 2(b), 39 Stat. 756, 757 (1916), which provided: 
[I)ncome of estates or any kind of property held in trust, ... for the benefit of unborn or 
unascertained persons, or persons with contingent interests, and income held for future 
distribution under the terms of the will or trust shall be likewise taxed, the tax in each 
instance, except when the income is returned for the purpose of the tax by the beneficiary, 
to be assessed to the executor, administrator or trustee, as the case may be: Provided, That 
where the income is to be distributed annually or regularly between existing heirs or lega-
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The tax law has favored shifting of income from accumulated 
wealth over shifting of income from services because, early on, the law 
had developed sophistication sufficient to thwart the latter.'' The law 
has permitted shifting of income from property even when the owner 
has not completely given the property away. This has easily been ac-
complished through the use of trusts. To be sure, Congress provided 
that retention of too much control by the grantor of a trust will result 
in taxation to the grantor of income from the portion controlled.~~ 
Nevertheless, as vexing to the taxpayer as these restrictions have 
seemed, they might best be described as safe harbors; if they were fol-
lowed, trust income would be taxable to a beneficiary6 or to the trust.7 
The Tax Court has rather bluntly noted that Congress, in respecting 
the separateness of the trust as a taxpayer, sanctioned tax avoidance: 
"[I]t must be noted that while Congress has carefully delineated cer-
tain areas in which tax-avoidance ... is the touchstone of tax liability, 
it has enacted no such provisions in the trust area."8 
In a complex trust,9 a grantor has the ability either to distribute 
income to a beneficiary or to have it accumulated by and taxed to the 
tees, or beneficiaries the rate of tax and methods of computing the same shall be based in 
each case upon the amount of the individual share to be distributed. 
There was no means of taxing the grantor of a revocable trust on the income thereof until 1924. 
3 8. 8ITTKER, fEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF INCOME, EsTATES AND GIFTS 1f 80.1.1 (1981). 
4. See Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. Ill (1930), in which the Court held: 
There is no doubt that the statute could tax salaries to those who earned them and provide 
that the tax could not . be escaped by anticipatory arrangements and contracts however 
skillfully devised to prevent the salary when paid from vesting even for a second in the man 
who earned it. 
/d. at 114-15. 
5. /d. at 114-15. Such "forbidden" controls include retention by the grantor of a reversion-
ary interest in excess of five percent of the value of any portion of the trust at its inception, see 
I.R.C. § 673(a) (1988); possession of a power, exercisable by the grantor or a nonadverse party or 
both, to dispose of the beneficial enjoyment of the corpus or income of any portion of the trust, see 
id. § 674(a); the ability to exercise certain administrative powers such as borrowing trust corpus 
or income without adequate security, see id. § 675(2); the power to revest any portion of the trust 
exercisable by the grantor or a nonadverse party, see id. § 676(a); the ability to have the income 
of any portion of the trust, without consent of an adverse party, distributed to the grantor or the 
grantor's spouse, held for future distribution to the grantor or the grantor's spouse, or applied to 
payment of premiums on policies of insurance on the life of the grantors or the grantor's spouse, 
see id. § 677(a); or the application of income for the support or maintenance of a beneficiary 
whom the grantor is legally obligated to support, see id. § 677(b). 
6. See I.R.C. § 61 (a)( 15) ( 1988); see also id. §§ 651, 662. 
7. See id. § 641. 
8. Morris Trusts v. Comm'r, 51 T.C. 20, 39 (1968) (footnote omitted), affd, 427 F.2d 1361 
(9th Cir. 1970). 
9. A complex trust is any trust that is not a simple trust. See generally I.R.C. §§ 661-662 
(1988). Under § 651, a simple trust is a trust that does not require that its income be distributed 
currently and that does not provide that its income may be paid, permanently set aside, or used 
for charitable purposes under § 642(c). 
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trust.t0 In the past, this option could be used to avoid distributions to a 
child of the grantor that might have been taxable to a grantor because 
they were in fulfillment of a legal obligation of support.11 
Under former law, if the income from a trust could be distributed 
to a child or other family member of the grantor without fulfilling an 
obligation of support, such income could be offset by the $1,000 per-
sonal exemption of the beneficiary. 12 
Although the landmark Supreme Court decision in Helvering v. 
Cli.ffortP8 was aimed at "temporary reallocation of income within an 
intimate family group,"14 in the public mind, Clifford became associ-
ated with the so-called "Clifford trust," a popular means of avoiding 
taxes on income from income-producing property.111 
The recognition of the trust for tax purposes and the safe harbors 
of the grantor trust rules created unfair tax advantages for affluent and 
sophisticated taxpayers. Use of trusts, like resort to tax shelters, pro-
vided inappropriate relief from the progressivity of income tax rates. 
Not surprisingly, then, as the drive for tax reform heated up in the 
mid-1980's, use of the trust as an income-shifting device within the 
family came under attack. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 was the prod-
uct of four comprehensive tax reform proposals: the Treasury Depart-
ment proposal of November 1984/6 President Reagan's May 1985 pro-
10. In a simple trust, the income required to be distributed is taxable to the beneficiary and 
deductible by the trust up to the amount of the distributable net income of the trust. Id. § 
651--652. Distributable net income is defined id. § 643(a). 
The complex trust provisions are found in §§ 661--662. Section 661 contemplates both distri-
butions that are required to be paid to a beneficiary and distributions that may be made, whereas 
section 662 requires a beneficiary to include such mandatory or permitted distributions as income 
to the extent of his or her share of the trust's distributable net income. If trust income is not 
required to be distributed currently, the trustee may determine whether it is taxable to the trust 
or the beneficiary by distributing it to the beneficiary or accumulating it in the trust. ld. § 
661--662. 
II. See id. § 677(b). The so-called throwback rule, §§ 665--668, is designed to thwart tax 
avoidance via accumulation of income by taxing distributions of accumulated income to benefi-
ciaries "as though they had been distributed to the beneficiaries in earlier years." 3 B. 8ITTKER, 
supra note 3, ~ 81.5.1. This device discourages accumulation only if the beneficiary is in a higher 
tax bracket in the years of accumulation than he or she is in the year of distribution. 
12. I.R.C. § 15l{b) {1985) (amended 1986). As of !987, however, the personal exemption 
is denied for an individual who may be claimed as a dependent for purposes of the exemption on 
the return of another. Id. § 151(d)(2) {1987). 
13. 309 u.s. 331 (1940). 
14. ld. at 335. 
15. I.R.C. § 673(a) {1954). A grantor could retain a reversionary interest in property 
placed in trust as long as the reversion would not reasonably be expected to take effect within 10 
years. ld. 
16. U.S. DEPT. OF TREAS., OFFICE OF THE SECY., TAX REFORM FOR fAIRNESS, SIMPLICITY 
AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: THE TREASURY DEPARTMENT REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT {1984) (here-
inafter TREASURY PROPOSAL]. 
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posal/'7 the bill passed by the House of Representatives in December 
1985,18 and the bill passed by the Senate on May 29, 1986.18 The first 
three of those proposals would have effectively nullified the separate 
identity of a trust as a taxpayer for income-shifting purposes. The lat-
ter, the Senate bill, which was closest to what ultimately became law, 
did not do so as completely as the others. 
All reform proposals included a dramatic new provision that would 
tax the income of children under fourteen as if it had been received by 
one or both of their parents.20 This provision, which was adopted,21 and 
17. THE PRESIDENT'S TAX PROPOSALS TO THE CONGRESS FOR FAIRNESS, GROWTH AND SJM· 
PUCITY (1985) (hereinafter REAGAN PROPOSAL]. 
18. H.R. 3838, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985), accompanied by H.R. REP. No. 426, 99th 
Cong., lst Sess. (1985) [hereinafter House Bill]. 
19. H.R. 3838, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986), accompanied by S. REP. No. 313, 99th Cong., 
2d Sess. (1986) [hereinafter Senate Bill]. 
20. See 2 TREASURY PROPOSAL, supra note 16, at 93-94; REAGAN PROPOSAL, supra note 
17, at 85; H. REP. No. 426, supra note 18, at 801; S. REP. No. 313, supra note 19, at 863. 
21. I.R.C. § 1 (i) provides: 
(i) Certain unearned income of minor children taxed as if parent's income.-
(1) In generaL-In the case of any child to whom this subsection applies, the 
tax imposed by this section shall be equal to the greater of-
(A) the tax imposed by this section without regard to this subsection, or 
(B) the sum of-
(i) the tax which would be imposed by this section if the taxable in-
come of such child for the taxable year were reduced by the net unearned 
income of such child, plus 
(ii) such child's share of the allocable parental tax. 
(2) Child to whom subsection applies.-This subsection shall apply to any child 
for any taxable year if-
(A) such child has not attained age 14 before the close of the taxable year, 
and 
(B) either parent of such child is alive at the close of the taxable year. 
(3) Allocable parental tax.-For purposes of this subsection-
(A) In generaL-The term "allocable parental tax" means the excess of-
(i) the tax which would be imposed by this section on the parent's taxa-
ble income if such income included the net unearned income of all children 
of the parent to whom this subsection applies, over 
(ii) the tax imposed by this section on the parent without regard to this 
subsection. 
For purposes of clause (i), net unearned income of all children of the parent 
shall not be taken into account in computing any deduction or credit of the 
parent. 
(B) Child's share.-A child's share of any allocable parental tax of a par-
ent shall be equal to an amount which bears the same ratio to the total alloca-
ble parental tax as the child's net unearned income bears to the aggregate net 
unearned income of all children of such parent to whom this subsection applies. 
(4) Net unearned income.-For purposes of this subsection-
(A) In generaL-The term "net unearned income" means the excess of-
(i) the portion of the gross income for the taxable year which is not 
earned income (as defined in section 911(d)(2)), over 
(ii) the sum of-
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which will be referred to herein as the parental tax, will diminish the 
usefulness of trusts for income-shifting purposes. Under this provision, 
in most instances, only the first $1 ,000 of unearned income will be 
taxed at the child's rate.22 It will have an impact on income shifting 
outside of the trust context as well. Nevertheless, the reform proposal 
adopted, which largely respects the separate tax identity of trusts, may, 
to some extent, permit the use of trusts to serve as an escape hatch for 
the parental tax. 
Perhaps the most significant vice of the former grantor trust provi-
sions was that they permitted "parking" of income-producing property 
in trust for tax purposes. The legislation ultimately enacted restricts 
but does not prevent this. On the other hand, of all four proposals for a 
parental tax, only the Senate bill would have taxed the unearned in-
come of minors under fourteen that is not attributable to parental 
sources at the marginal rate of one or both of the parents. 
This article explores the effects of the provisions of the Tax Re-
form Act of 1986 aimed at income shifting within the family. The arti-
cle first examines in detail changes that will affect income shifting. 
Second, the article compares these changes with parallel provisions of 
the various tax reform proposals to evaluate whether the most effective 
solutions to past abuses were selected. Third, the article examines the 
potential effects of existing law upon the Act. Finally, the article in-
(I) the amount in effect for the taxable year under section 
63(c)(5)(A) (relating to limitation on standard deduction in the case 
of certain dependents), plus 
(II) the greater of the amount described in subclause (I) or, if 
the child itemizes his deduction for the taxable year, the amount of 
the deductions allowed by this chapter for the taxable year which are 
directly connected with the production of the portion of gross income 
referred to in clause (i). 
(B) Limitation based on taxable income.-The amount of the net 
unearned income for any taxable year shall not exceed the individual's taxable 
income for such taxable year. 
(5) Special rules for determining parent to whom subsection applies.-For pur-
poses of this subsection, the parent whose taxable income shall be taken into ac-
count shall be-
(A) in the case of parents who are not married (within the meaning of 
section 7703), the custodial parent of the child, and 
(B) in the case of married individuals filing separately, the individual with 
the greater taxable income. 
22. /d. § l(i)(4)(A)(ii)(I)-(II); see also Treas. Reg. § l.l(i)-IT, A-1 (1987). In the par-
lance of the statute, the net unearned income of the child under 14 is taxable at the tax rate of the 
parent. This net unearned income is the amount by which unearned income exceeds $500, the 
child's standard deduction under § 63(c)(5)(A), if the child may be claimed for a dependency 
exemption by another taxpayer and such child does not have earned income in a greater amount, 
plus the greater of the standard deduction or the portion of itemized deductions directly connected 
with the production of the child's unearned income. 
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eludes a discussion of the effects of the Act outside the sphere of the 
use of trusts to shift income-most prominently, the Act's effects on 
family partnerships and S corporations. 
II. WHAT CONGRESS DID: INCOME SHIFTING AND THE TAX REFORM 
ACT OF 1986. 
The attacks of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 on income shifting 
within a family are two-fold: several modifications were have been 
made to the trust provisions of the Code and the marginal rate applica-
ble to the income of minor children under fourteen has been changed to 
that of the parents. 
A. Changes in Code Provisions Affecting Trusts 
1. Increase in Tax Rates Applicable to Trusts 
Several changes were made in provisions of the Code pertaining to 
trusts that either directly restrict income shifting or indirectly make it 
less attractive. Perhaps the most dramatic in the long run, if the most 
mundane, was a significant increase in the rates applicable to trusts 
and estates/"3 The new rates, of course, must be viewed in the context 
of the entire Act. The maximum tax rate on trust income, twenty-eight 
percent, will apply for taxable years beginning 1988 to taxable income 
over $5,000. Under rates applicable for 1986, the twenty-eight percent 
bracket was not reached until a taxable income in excess of $14,300.2" 
The new tax rates on trusts tend to discourage resort to trusts to 
avoid taxation because the rates are higher than those upon individuals. 
For married taxpayers filing jointly, the twenty-eight percent bracket 
begins at taxable income of $29,750;211 for unmarried individuals other 
than surviving spouses or heads of households, it begins at $17 ,850;26 
and for married individuals filing separately, the highest rate begins at 
taxable income of $14,875.27 Clearly, much less income of a trust is 
subject to the lower fifteen percent bracket than the incomes of other 
23. See id. § !(e). This section provides: 
(e) Estates and trusts.-There is hereby imposed on the taxable income of-
( I) every estate, and 
(2) every trust, 
taxable under this subsection a tax determined in accordance with the following table: 
If taxable income is: The tax is: 
Not over $5,000 ........................... 15% of taxable income 
Over $5,000 ............................... $750, plus 28% of the excess over $5,000 
24. See I STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH) § 1116 (1987). 
25. l.R.C. § l(a) (1988). 
26. /d. § I(c). 
27. /d. § I(d). 
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noncorporate taxpayers. Further, under the Act the benefit of the fif-
teen percent bracket begins to phase out at a much lower level of in-
come, $13,000, than it does for married taxpayers filing jointly, for 
whom such phaseout begins at taxable income of $71,900.28 
The decrease in the progressivity of rates applicable to individuals 
reduces the incentive to attempt to shift income to or through a trust. 
Nevertheless, up to a taxable income of $13,000, a trust retains the 
benefit of the fifteen percent bracket for its first $5,000 of income. Fur-
thermore, to the extent an individual taxpayer can shift income to a 
trust, he or she may avoid a phaseout of the benefit of the fifteen per-
cent bracket and personal exemptions on his or her own return. Given 
the significant increase in the amount of the personal exemption to 
$2,000, effective in 1989,29 high-income taxpayers who have a signifi-
cant number of personal exemptions might have an incentive to place 
income-producing assets in trust in order to avoid phaseout of the fif-
teen percent bracket and personal exemptions.30 
2. Changes in the Effects of the Grantor's Retention of a Reversion-
ary Interest 
A second significant modification in the Code provisions pertaining 
to trusts, and one that more directly restricts the shifting of income 
through the use of trusts, is the change to I.R.C. § 673. New section 
673 provides: 
The grantor shall be treated as the owner of any portion of a trust in 
which he has a reversionary interest in either the corpus or the income 
therefrom, if, as of the inception of that portion of the trust, the value of 
28. Under § I (g), the tax is increased 5%, above the maximum rate of 28% upon the 
excess of the taxable income over the applicable dollar amount, i.e., the beginning of the phaseout. 
See id. § I (g)(3). This surcharge applies to an amount of taxable income up to the sum of 13% of 
the income to which the 15% bracket applies and 28% of the amount of the deductions for 
personal exemptions. See id. § I(g)(2)(A)-(B). The applicability of what amounts to a 33% rate 
of taxation results in a complete phaseout of the benefit of the 15% bracket for trusts at an 
income level of $13,950 or $13,750, depending upon the amount of the personal exemption availa-
ble to the trust. See id. § 642(b) (providing that a trust required to distribute all of its income 
currently is allowed a personal exemption of $300, while all other trusts are allowed a personal 
exemption of $100). 
29. See id. § 15I(d)(I)(C). 
30. Such a maneuver might also be helpful in avoiding phaseout of the $25,000 exemption 
from the disallowance of losses in passive activities under § 469(i), which begins at an adjusted 
gross income of$100,000. ld. § 469(i)(3)(A). The IRS has provided in temporary regulations that 
a child's tax under the parental tax is affected by the parent's phaseout of the 15% bracket and 
personal exemptions, Treas. Reg. § I. I (i)-IT, A-20 (1987), but the parent's phaseout of the pas-
sive loss allowance is not affected by addition of the child's net unearned income for purposes of 
the parental tax. /d. at Q-21. 
Such taxpayers, however, must not retain a reversionary interest the value of which exceeds 
five percent of the value of the trust property. /d. § 673(a). 
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such interest exceeds 5 percent of the value of such portion.81 
Former section 673(a) treated the grantor as the owner of any portion 
of the trust in which he or she had a reversionary interest in either 
corpus or income, if at the inception of such portion of the trust, such 
interest might reasonably have been expected to take effect within ten 
years.32 
Former section 673 was the basis of the "Clifford trust," which, in 
the argot of tax avoidance, was a trust in which the corpus could not 
revert to the grantor for a minimum period of ten years. During that 
period the income could be accumulated for purposes such as college 
expenses without tax consequences to the grantor. The ability of the 
grantor to get the corpus back after a definite period while shifting tax 
consequences from such corpus in the interim provided significant flexi-
bility to taxpayers with accumulated property. 
As discussed above, even with lower tax rates for individuals and 
higher rates for trusts under the Act, taxpayers might still have an 
incentive to shift income to trusts. With the elimination of the ten year 
safe harbor, however, a grantor has less fte.xibility in planning to get 
the corpus back. 
New section 673 does carve out an exception to the rule that a 
reversionary interest valued in excess of five percent of the corpus will 
result in the grantor being treated as owner of such portion. The .sec-
tion provides that the grantor will not be treated as the owner of any 
portion in which he or she has a reversionary interest if the beneficiary 
of such portion is a lineal descendant of the grantor and holds all pre-
sent interest in such portion and such reversionary interest takes effect 
only upon the death of such beneficiary before such beneficiary reaches 
the age of twenty-one.33 
The safe harbor of the Act allows, at best, only a modicum of 
doomsday planning. It allows the grantor to regain control of the 
corpus in the relatively unlikely event of the death of a child or 
grandchild beneficiary before such beneficiary reaches the age of 
twenty-one. It permits the grantor to keep such corpus subject to his or 
her control and perhaps within the family, rather than permitting it to 
31. /d. § 673(a). Neither the statute nor the committee reports indicate how a reversionary 
interest is to be valued. Presumably such valuation will be made in a manner similar to that for 
purposes of the gross estate under§ 2031. Treas. Reg.§ 20.2031-IO(d) (as amended T.D. 7955, 
1984-1 C.B. 40) provides a reference to an actuarial table at § 20.2031-10(0. However, if the 
reversion is dependent upon the continuation or termination of more than one life, a special factor 
(multiplier) must be used which, in some instances, may be obtained directly from § 20.2031-
10(e). 
32. I.R.C. § 673(a) (1954). 
33. /d. § 673(b) (1988). 
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become part of the estate of the beneficiary. 
Obviously, new section 673 provides no ability for shifting income 
to a beneficiary older than the grantor while the grantor retains a re-
versionary interest; in contrast, former section 673(c) did contain such 
a safe harbor.34 With America's population aging, it is unfortunate that 
Congress eliminated former section 673(c), a provision that facilitated 
support of elderly relatives by taxpayers. However, the curtailment of 
tax benefits from the use of trusts in which the grantor retained a re-
versionary interest was an important objective of Congress with respect 
to the Act.311 
3. Changes Affecting Deferral of Income and Payment of Tax 
Congress made two other changes in the taX: treatment of trusts 
that might affect the desirability of resort to a trust: under new section 
645, trusts are generally required to adopt the calendar year as a taxa-
ble year; and under section 6654(/), trusts are now required to make 
estimated tax payments, a requirement for individuals since 1944.88 
The requirement that trusts adopt a calendar year removes an op-
portunity for deferral of the reporting of trust income by a calendar 
year beneficiary through selection for the trust of a fiscal year ending 
in January. If distributions by the trust were delayed until the end of 
such a fiscal year, they would be reported by the beneficiary in a taxa-
ble year that would not end until eleven months after the trust's taxa-
ble year. Significant deferral of taxation of trust income could be 
achieved in this way. The income taxed to the beneficiary might have 
pertained to a period twenty-three months before the end of the taxable 
34. /d.§ 673(c) (1954) (repealed 1986). Under former§ 673(c), a former grantor was not 
treated as owner of any portion of a trust when his reversionary interest in such portion would not 
take effect in possession or enjoyment until the death of an income beneficiary. This permitted a 
grantor to shift income to an elderly beneficiary for life regardless of such beneficiary's life expec-
tancy. See Treas. Reg.§ 1.673(a)-l(b) (1956). 
35. STAFF OF JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, 100TH CONG., 1ST SESS., GENERAL EXPLA-
NATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986, at 1248 (Comm. Print 1987). 
Under the Act, § 674(b)(2) was amended to provide that the possession of a reversionary 
interest by the grantor that does not subject the grantor to taxation under § 673(b) until a partic-
ular event occurs will also not subject the grantor to taxation under § 674(a). A similar confirm-
ing amendment was made to § 676(b) concerning a power in the grantor to revoke a beneficial 
interest in the income of a trust. Both § 674 and § 676, in their references to § 673, now reflect § 
673's new emphasis upon the likelihood of an event rather than the expiration of a period of time 
in determining whether a grantor will be taxed. 
36. See Individual Income Tax Act of 1944, ch. 210, 58 Stat. 315. 
Since income tax withholding under I.R.C. § 3402 is only against wages of employees, and 
since under id. § 6654(k) (I 954) (amended 1986) (current version at I.R.C. § 6654(/)), trusts 
were not required to make estimated tax payments, trusts enjoyed the privilege of paying taxes 
only at the end of the year-a privilege long denied other taxpayers. 
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year of the beneficiary.87 Since it is quite likely that many taxable ben-
eficiaries will be unsophisticated taxpayers who do not keep formal 
books and are therefore required to report on a calendar year, 88 they 
will not be in a position to achieve tax deferral through variation in the 
taxable year between trust and beneficiary. 
B. What Congress Might Have Done, but Did Not Do, to Income 
Shifting 
The ultimate changes to the rules for taxation of trusts seem mod-
est when compared to the criticism of the role of the trust in tax avoid-
ance contained in the 1984 Report of the Treasury Department to the 
President: 
No discernible social policy is served by [the] tax incentive for the crea-
tion of trusts and the accumulation of income within them . . . . 
[C]urrent tax policy has not only sacrificed tax revenue with respect to 
trust income, it also has encouraged artificial and inefficient arrange-
ments for the ownership and management of property.39 
The criticism of President Reagan's proposal for tax reform of re-
sort to the trust device to avoid taxes was also quite pointed: 
During the lifetime of the grantor, there is no persuasive justification for 
taxing a trust under its own graduated rate schedule. Permitting a gran-
tor to create trusts and thereby obtain the benefit of multiple graduated 
rate schedules is inconsistent with the principle that all income of an 
individual taxpayer should be subject to tax under the same progressive 
rate structure.40 
The report of the House Ways and Means Committee accompanying 
its version of the Act was perhaps not quite as sweeping in its criticism 
of use of the trust device but did express concern about "the inherent 
tax benefits arising under the present rules governing the taxation of 
trusts. "fl The House Report viewed such problems as arising "because 
37. This change was probably long overdue, as it has already been visited upon other con-
duit-taxpayers. Partnerships are quite restricted in their ability to select a taxable year that per-
mits deferral of income, see I.R.C. § 706(b), and S corporations must generally select a calendar 
year. See id. § l378(b). 
38. See id. § 441(g). 
39. 2 TREASURY PROPOSAL, supra note 16, at 98-99. 
40. REAGAN PROPOSAL, supra note 17, at 90. 
41. H.R. REP. No. 426, supra note 18, at 811. 
The Committee saw the benefits to taxpayers from the taxation of trusts as four-fold: I) 
creation of separate taxpayers entitled to separate rate structures and exemptions through creation 
of trusts, 2) deferral of tax on trust income through selection of taxable years that do not coincide 
with those of the beneficiaries, 3) separation of taxation of the stream of income from assets from 
the ownership of those assets through trusts, and 4) minimization of taxes by spraying of income 
through discretionary trusts to beneficiaries with the lowest taxable incomes. 
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present law provides separate tax rates to trusts or estates and taxes 
beneficiaries on distributions from the trust or estate."42 
The tax reform proposals other than that of the Senate essentially 
eliminated the separate tax identity for trusts. The Treasury and the 
Reagan plans, which were not accompanied by draft legislation, pro-
posed to distinguish between grantor-owned and non-grantor-owned 
trusts. The income of grantor-owned trusts48 would have been taxed to 
the grantor."" Under the Treasury and Reagan proposals, income from 
non-grantor-owned trusts would have been taxed at the same rate as if 
it had been added to the grantor's other income."11 In arriving at the 
taxable income of such trusts, both proposals would have allowed de-
ductions for mandatory distributions. A distribution would have been 
considered mandatory only if a fixed or ascertainable amount of trust 
income or property were required to be distributed to a specific benefi-
ciary or beneficiaries."6 Under both proposals a beneficiary of a trust 
would have been taxed on income from property irrevocably set aside 
for such beneficiary."7 The net effect of this scheme would have been 
that the income from a trust would have been taxable either to the 
trust, at the same rate as if it had been added to the income of the 
grantor, or to the beneficiary. The trust itself would have had no signif-
icance in determining the rate of taxation. Since, under both proposals, 
beneficiaries under age fourteen would have been taxed on their 
unearned income at the marginal rates of their parents,n it would not 
have been possible to use the trust device as a separate taxpayer or as a 
means of diverting income to or for young children in order to avoid 
42. /d. 
43. Under both provisions, trusts were treated as owned by the grantor if 
(i) payments of property or income are required to be made currently to the grantor or the 
grantor's spouse; (ii) payments of property or income may be made currently to the grantor 
or the grantor's spouse under a discretionary power held in whole or in part by either one 
of them; (iii) the grantor or the grantor's spouse has any power to amend or revoke the 
trust and cause distributions of property to be made to either one of them; (iv) the grantor 
or the grantor's spouse has any power to cause the trustee to lend trust income or corpus to 
either of them; or (v) the grantor or the grantor's spouse has borrowed trust income or 
corpus and has not completely repaid the loan or any interest thereon before the beginning 
of the taxable year. 
2 TREASURY PROPOSAL, supra note 16, at 99; REAGAN PROPOSAL, supra note 17, at 91. 
44. 2 TREASURY PROPOSAL, supra note 16, at 100; REAGAN PROPOSAL, supra note 17, at 
100. 
45. 2 TREASURY PROPOSAL, supra note 16, at 102; REAGAN PROPOSAL, supra note 17, at 
94. 
46. 2 TREASURY PROPOSAL, supra note 16, at 101; REAGAN PROPOSAL, supra note 17, at 
92-93. 
47. 2 TREASURY PROPOSAL, supra note 16, at 101; REAGAN PROPOSAL, supra note 17, at 
93. 
48. 2 TREASURY PROPOSAL, supra note 16, at 94; REAGAN PROPOSAL, supra note 17, at 85. 
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taxing income from property from a grantor at the marginal rate of the 
grantor. 
The House proposal would have achieved largely the same end 
through different means. Under that proposal, non-grantor-owned 
trusts49 would have been taxed during the lifetime of the grantor at the 
top marginal rate of the grantor, generally without deduction for distri-
butions to beneficiaries.'10 This would have been accomplished through 
a convoluted scheme of allowing a grantor to allocate his or her unused 
rate brackets to the trust for the purpose of determining the trust's tax 
rate. 111 The House bill provided two exceptions to the rule that trust 
income was to be taxed at the marginal rates of the grantor. In the 
case of a qualified beneficiary trust,112 the income would have been 
taxed at the marginal rates of the beneficiary. -In the case of a qualified 
children's trust,113 the income would have been taxed at the unused tax 
brackets of the children. 114 
Neither of these exceptions to the general rule of taxation at the 
grantor's highest marginal rate would have permitted use of the trust 
to avoid this general rule if the beneficiary were a child of the grantor 
under age fourteen. In such a case, the beneficiary's unused rate brack-
ets would not have been permitted to be allocated to the trust.u 
49. The House proposal would have treated the grantor as owner of a trust in fewer in-
stances than the Treasury or Reagan proposals or than under former law. See supra note 5. The 
grantor would have been treated as owner of the trust if: I) the grantor or the grantor's spouse 
retained the power to deal with the trust for less than adequate and full consideration, to borrow 
without adequate interest or security, or had borrowed from the trust and had not repaid such 
amount before the beginning of the taxable year, 2) the trust was subject to a power to revoke 
that enables the grantor or the grantor's spouse to revest part or all of the trust in the grantor or 
the grantor's spouse, or 3) any portion of the trust was required to be or might have been, in the 
discretion of the grantor or the grantor's spouse, held for distribution to the grantor or the gran-
tor's spouse, or applied to the payment of premiums on life insurance policies on the grantor or the 
grantor's spouse. H.R. REP. No. 426, supra note 18, at 817-18. 
50. /d. at 812. 
51. Under the House bill there were four tax rate brackets: 15%,25%, 35% and 38%. /d. 
at 4. To the extent that the taxable income of a married grantor filing jointly was less than 
$43,000, he or she would have been able to allocate his or her 25% bracket to the taxable income 
of the trust; to the extent his or her taxable income was less than $100,000, he or she would have 
been able to allocate his or her 35% bracket to the taxable income of the trust. /d. at 813-14. 
52. A qualified beneficiary trust is a trust in which all of the income or principal would be 
irrevocably allocated to a particular individual or his estate at all times during a taxable year and 
thereafter. /d. at 816. 
53. A qualified children's trust is a trust in which all of the principal and income must have 
been irrevocably devoted for the taxable year and all subsequent years to the children of the 
grantor. /d. at 816-17. 
54. The primary difference between the qualified beneficiary trust and the qualified chil-
dren's trust appears to have been that in a qualified children's trust the irrevocable commitment of 
income and corpus could have been to a group of beneficiaries, the grantor's children, rather than 
to a single beneficiary and his or her estate. /d. 
55. /d. 
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Like the Treasury and the Reagan proposals, the House bill would 
not have permitted taxpayers to accumulate income in a trust in order 
to avoid taxation of the child's income at the marginal rate of the par-
ent. As discussed above, the Act, as did former law, treats non-grantor 
trusts as separate taxpayers, taxable at t~eir own rates. Unless income 
ultimately distributable to a child of the grantor is distributed to the 
child in the taxable year, it is taxable to the trust at the trust's rate.t~6 
A trust may thus be used to accumulate income for a child until such 
child is fourteen, thereby avoiding the parental tax of I.R.C. § 1 (i). 
Just how much of an opportunity for avoidance this creates, particu-
larly in light of the new tax rates applicable to trusts under the Act and 
the general flattening of rates, shall be discussed shortly. 
As to trust beneficiaries other than the children of the grantor 
under age fourteen, the Act provides for more flexibility than alterna-
tive proposals in accumulating income while avoiding taxation of trust 
income at the grantor's rate. As noted above, the Treasury117 and Rea-
gan proposals118 and the House bill119 would have required that property 
and income be irrevocably set aside for a beneficiary (or his or her 
estate) in order for the trust income not distributed to a beneficiary to 
be taxed to such beneficiary rather than to the grantor. The Act does 
not require such an irrevocable commitment. As long as the grantor 
does not provide for a reversionary interest worth more than five per-
cent of the trust corpus, or portion thereof, a grantor may provide for 
alternative ultimate dispositions of the trust corpus and still have in-
come taxed to the trust or beneficiaries rather than the grantor. By not 
requiring an irrevocable commitment of income to particular benefi-
ciaries the Act permits "spraying" of corpus among beneficiaries.60 
Further, unless a grantor retains a reversionary interest that would 
make income of the trust taxable to him or her under new section 
674(b), the Act contains no new limitations on the ability of a grantor 
to use a trust to shift income to a beneficiary who is not a minor child 
56. H.R. REP. No. 841, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986). 
57. TREASURY PROPOSAL, supra note 16, at 101; see also supra note 47 and accompanying 
text. 
58. REAGAN PROPOSAL, supra note 17, at 93; see also supra note 47 and accompanying 
text. 
59. H.R. REP. No. 426, supra note 18, at 816-17; see also supra notes 52-53 and accompa-
nying text. 
60. In order not to cause such income to be taxed to the grantor, power to allocate corpus to 
different beneficiaries must be limited in the manner provided by I.R.C. § 674(b)(5) (1988) if it is 
exercisable by the grantor, or by id. § 674(c) if it is exercisable only by independent trustees. 
Section 674(b)(5) requires that such distributions of corpus to current income beneficiaries be 
chargeable against the proportionate share of corpus held in trust for such beneficiaries and that 
distributions for other beneficiaries be limited by a "reasonably definite standard." Corpus distri-
butions by independent trustees under § 674(c) are not similarly restricted. 
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under the age of fourteen. 
Nevertheless, it appears that the most significant tax avoidance de-
vice permitted by the Act that was not permitted by the alternative tax 
proposals is the ability to sidestep the parental tax by having trust in-
come taxed to a trust at a trust's own tax rate. 
C. Use of Trusts for Tax Avoidance Under the Act: How Significant 
a Loophole? 
All of the reform proposals discussed herein sought to make the 
tax law fairer by restricting income-shifting devices within a family. 
Under proposals other than the Senate biil, the only way to avoid taxa-
tion of trust income at the grantor's tax rate would have been to dis-
tribute the income, actually or constructively, to particular benefi-
ciaries. If such beneficiaries were children of the grantor under 
fourteen, all proposals, including the Senate bill, would have taxed the 
income at the grantor's rate. Under the Act, however, it is not neces-
sary for a trust to make a distribution or a set aside in order to avoid 
taxation of income at the tax rate of the grantor. A parent has an in-
centive to accumulate income in a trust for a minor child until the child 
is fourteen and to provide then for distribution from the trust, taxable 
to the child.61 
Such a two-step process flies in the face both of the reformist no-
tion that the artifice of the trust should not be used to avoid taxes, and 
the more concrete restriction of shifting of income to children of the 
grantor under fourteen. Such a scheme may be useful where the 
amount of income generated by trust property is small enough, when 
the eventual child-beneficiary is under fourteen, to be taxed to the trust 
at the fifteen-percent rate.62 Two important income shifting restrictions 
of prior law may present difficulties for this two-step avoidance process: 
Section 643(0, the multiple-trust rule; and section 677(b), which pro-
vides for taxation to the grantor trust of income used to discharge an 
obligation of support of the grantor. 
1. The Multiple-Trust Rule 
The relatively low level of income at which the twenty-eight per-
cent bracket becomes effective for trusts would ostensibly encourage a 
grantor to put into as many trusts as possible property as to which he 
or she wishes to shift income. For example, if a grantor has five chil-
61. Accumulation in a trust vis ii vis distribution to a child is also made more attractive by 
substitution in the Act of a $500 standard deduction for the unearned income of a child, see id. § 
63(c)(5)(A), for the personal exemption available under prior law. See id. § 151 (I 954) (current 
version at I.R.C. § 15I(d)(2)). 
62. See supra notes 22-30 and accompanying text. 
1987] SHIFTING OF INCOME WITHIN FAMILY 15 
dren under fourteen, he or she would be encouraged to set up at least 
five separate trusts. In 1984, Congress enacted section 643{f)63 to ad-
dress the problem of avoidance of taxes through multiple trusts. Aggre-
gation of trusts, of course, can result in the total income being taxed at 
a higher rate. The incentive to use trusts to avoid the new parental tax 
will undoubtedly lead to scrutiny of the efficacy of section 643(f) to 
thwart avoidance through multiple trusts. That is ironic because the 
Treasury reform proposal decried prior law as creating the necessity for 
a multiple-trust rule.64 
The multiple-trust rule of section 643(f) permits the IRS to treat 
two or more trusts as one if the trusts have substantially the same pri-
mary beneficiary or beneficiaries and a principal purpose of such trusts 
is tax avoidance. This provision was enacted in the wake of the decision 
of the Tax Court in Stephenson Trust v. Commissioner,6" which invali-
dated regulations that were quite similar to section 643(f).66 
The Tax Court's invalidation of the consolidation regulations in-
volved a broad sanctioning of the use of trusts to shift income as long • 
as proper trust form was respected. The trust arrangement given effect 
therein involved two simple trusts that could "pour over" into compan-
ion accumulation trusts. In both cases, the beneficiaries of both trusts 
were the same or nearly the same. 
In its report accompanying passage of section 643(f), the House 
stated its belief that rules similar to those that had been imposed in the 
invalidated IRS regulations were necessary to prevent significant re-
duction of taxation of investment income through use of multiple 
63. I.R.C. § 643(1) (originally enacted as I.R.C. § 643(e)) provides: 
For purposes of this subchapter, under regulations prescribed by the Secretary, 2 or more 
trusts shall be treated as I trust if-
( I) such trusts have substantially the same grantor or grantors and substantially the 
same primary beneficiary or beneficiaries, and 
(2) a principal purpose of such trusts is the avoidance of the tax imposed by this 
chapter. 
For purposes of the preceding sentence, a husband and wife shall be treated as I person. 
64. 2 TREASURY PROPOSAL, supra note 16, at 100; see a/so REAGAN PROPOSAL, supra note 
17, at 90-91. 
65. 81 T.C. 283 ( 1983). 
66. Treas. Reg. § 1.641(a)-O(c) (1972), invalidated by the Tax Court in Stephenson Trust, 
provided: 
Multiple trusts that have-
( I) No substantially independent purposes (such as independent dispositive 
purposes), 
(2) The same grantor and substantially the same beneficiary, and 
(3) The avoidance or mitigation of (a) the progressive rates of tax (including 
mitigation as a result of deferral of tax) or (b) the minimum tax for tax preferences 
imposed by section 56 as their principal purpose, 
shall be consolidated and treated as one trust for the purposes of subchapter J. 
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trusts.67 Under section 643(0, the IRS may aggregate multiple trusts 
when two requirements are met: when such trusts have substantially 
the same grantors and beneficiaries and a principal purpose of tax 
avoidance. 
The effectiveness of section 643(0 in combating avoidance of the 
parental tax through resort to multiple trusts will depend upon the con-
struction given the terms "substantially the same grantors and benefi-
ciaries" and "a principal purpose of tax avoidance." The statute con-
templated promulgation of regulations, but none have yet been 
proposed by Treasury. For the time being, the only interpretive guid-
ance is the House report,68 which discusses when the committee would 
expect trusts to be treated as having different or the same grantors or 
beneficiaries. 
The committee stated that "trusts will not be treated as having 
different primary beneficiaries merely because the trust has different 
contingent beneficiaries."69 The report provides two examples, one in-
volving trusts that the committee stated should be aggregated and one 
involving trusts that it stated should not be aggregated. 
In the first example, a grantor set up four trusts, the beneficiaries 
of which were the grantor's two brothers and two sisters. Each trust 
had two beneficiaries; each of the group of four beneficiaries was not a 
beneficiary of at least one of the trusts. The report stated that these 
trusts should have been treated as one trust.70 
This example is an extreme case. Two-thirds of the beneficiaries of 
each trust were identical to two-thirds of the beneficiaries of each other 
trust. It is not clear that this degree of overlap of beneficiaries will be 
necessary to permit the IRS to aggregate multiple trusts. 
The second example provided by the committee demonstrates how 
a purpose independent of tax considerations may prevent aggregation. 
In that example a grantor set up two trusts. The grantor's son was the 
income beneficiary of the first trust and the grantor's daughter was the 
remainder beneficiary. The daughter was an income and remainder 
beneficiary of the second trust; the trustee of the second trust was per-
mitted to use income for her education, support and maintenance. The 
trustee of the second trust was also permitted to pay income or corpus 
for the son's medical expenses.71 
The two trusts had a significant overlap of beneficiaries, although 
the daughter was not an income beneficiary of the first trust. Aggrega-
67. H.R. REP. No. 432, Supplemental Report, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 1239 (1984). 
68. /d. 
69. /d. at 1240. 
70. /d. 
71. /d. 
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tion was not required in this second case, apparently, because the dis-
tributions of income from the trusts were to be used for different speci-
fied purposes. 
The examples and limited discussion in the House report do not 
indicate that the multiple trust rule will be a major obstacle in the use 
of trusts to avoid the parental tax. The rule does not appear to be 
aimed at a situation in which separate trusts are created for each of a 
grantor's children or grandchildren. 
Second, since the report states that the presence of different con-
tingent beneficiaries will not prevent trusts with the same primary ben-
eficiaries from being aggregated, perhaps the· presence of the same con-
tingent beneficiaries will not result in aggregation of trusts with 
different primary beneficiaries. An ability to create separate trusts with 
overlapping contingent beneficiaries would provide a grantor with reas-
suring latitude with respect to the ultimate disposition of the corpus of 
the trusts. 
Finally, the second committee example indicates that some overlap 
of income beneficiaries may be permitted when the income of each 
trust may be used only for different specified purposes. The Tax Court 
in Stephenson Trust saw little purpose in creating multiple trusts other 
·than the avoidance of taxes.72 Drafters of trust agreements can view 
the matter with more imagination.73 
At any rate, the legislative history of the multiple trust rule does 
not in any way indicate that the rule may be used to aggregate trusts 
when there is no overlap of beneficiaries. Thus, a grantor with several 
children or grandchildren might apparently set up at least one com-
pletely separate trust for each member of such groups without fear of 
IRS aggregation of such trusts under the multiple trust rule. It appears 
that the multiple-trust rule, as explained in its legislative history, will 
not completely prevent resort to multiple trusts to avoid the parental 
tax.74 
72. Stephenson Trust, 81 T.C. at 303. 
73. Obviously, one can carry this notion too far. For example, assume that X has three 
children A, B and C, and sets up three trusts. As to trust one, the trustee may distribute income to 
A and may pay medical expenses of B and education expenses of C. As to trust two, the trustee 
may distribute income to B and may pay education expenses of A and medical expenses of C. As 
to trust three, the trustee may distribute income to C and may pay medical expenses of A and 
education expenses of B. The trusts would have separate purposes but it is difficult to imagine that 
their separate existences would be recognized for tax purposes because the existence itself of sepa-
rate trusts could be attributed primarily to tax purposes. See H.R. REP. No. 432, supra note 67, at 
1240. 
74. The major weapon of the Code against tax avoidance by accumulation of trust income, 
the throwback rule, which taxes distributions of accumulated income to a trust beneficiary as if 
they had been made when the income was accumulated, see I.R.C. §§ 666-668 (1988), would not 
be effective against this strategy because it does not apply to distributions of income accumulated 
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2. I.R.C. § 677(b) 
When the minor beneficiary of a trust reaches age fourteen, the 
Act creates an incentive to have the trust distribute income to the bene-
ficiary rather than continue to accumulate such income. This is because 
even unearned income of an unmarried taxpayer aged fourteen or older 
is taxed at rates applicable to a single individual. For such an individ-
ual, such income would be taxed at a rate of fifteen percent up to taxa-
ble income of $17,850.711 The raising of tax rates on trusts vis ii vis 
individual taxpayers creates a new incentive to distribute income to 
beneficiaries rather than accumulate it in the trust. 
Distributions of income to a beneficiary will result in taxation of 
such income to the grantor under section 677(b) if such income is ap-
plied or distributed "for the support or maintenance of a beneficiary 
(other than the grantor's spouse) whom the grantor is legally obligated 
to support or maintain."78 If the Act's new rate scheme encourages a 
larger number of distributions of trust income to minor beneficiaries, 
there may very well be a great deal of litigation about whether such 
distributions may be regarded as in discharge of a legal obligation of 
support. Treasury Regulations applicable to section 677(b) provide no 
guidance or examples as to when a distribution to or for a minor child 
constitutes a discharge of a legal obligation of support.77 The courts 
have looked to state law to determine whether it imposes upon the 
grantor an obligation corresponding to the purpose for which the in-
come is distributed.78 
for a beneficiary before he or she reaches the age of 21. /d. § 665(b)(2). 
75. /d. § I (c). 
76. /d. § 677(b) provides in full: 
Income of a trust shall not be considered taxable to the grantor under subsection (a) or any 
other provision of this chapter merely because such income in the discretion of another 
person, the trustee, or the grantor acting as trustee or co-trustee, may be applied or distrib-
uted for the support or maintenance of a beneficiary (other than the grantor's spouse) 
whom the grantor is legally obligated to support or maintain, except to the extent that such 
income is so applied or distributed. In cases where the amounts so applied or distributed 
are paid out of corpus or out of other than income for the taxable year, such amounts shall 
be considered to be an amount paid or credited within the meaning of paragraph (2) of 
section 661 (a) and shall be taxed to the grantor under section 662. 
The statutory ancestor of§ 677(b), Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 63, § 167(c), 58 Stat. 51, 52 
(1944), was enacted by Congress to overturn the rule of Helvering v. Stuart, 317 U.S. !54 (1942) 
(holding that if the income of a trust might, in the discretion of persons lacking a substantial 
interest adverse to the grantor, be applied in discharge of a grantor's legal obligations, such in-
come would be taxable to the grantor regardless of whether or not it was so distributed). SeeS. 
REP. No. 627, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 68 (1943). 
77. See Treas. Reg. § 1.677(b)-1 (as amended by T.D. 7148, 1971-2 C.B. 251). 
78. See Brooke v. United States, 468 F.2d 1155 (9th Cir. 1972); Wyche v. United States, 
36 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H)~ 75-5241 (Ct. Cl. 1974); Braun v. Comm'r, 48 T.C.M. (CCH) 210 (1984). 
Brooke and Wyche looked to state law in reliance upon Rev. Rul. 56-484, 1956-2 C.B. 23. That 
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In leaving to state law the matter of which distributions will be 
regarded as in fulfillment of a legal obligation of support and, hence, 
taxable to the grantor, the Code, the IRS, and the courts have created 
uncertainty and lack of uniformity. This lack of uniformity has long 
been recognized as a problem in the tax law.79 Obviously, a parent 
seeking to avoid taxation on distribution of trust income should be 
careful not to specify that distributions from trust income be made for 
purposes specified in a state statute as part of the parent's obligation of 
support. Most state statutes, however, are not very specific as to the 
extent of the parental obligation of support.80 Nonetheless, even if a 
ruling, however, did not specifically involve the grantor trust provisions. It was concerned in part 
with the income tax effect of a transfer of property under a model custodian act. The ruling stated 
that if income from such transferred property were used "in the discharge or satisfaction . . . of a 
legal obligation of any person to support or maintain a minor," the income so used is taxable to 
such person under I.R.C. § 61. Rev. Rut. 56-484, supra, at 24. 
This ruling calls for broader attribution than under I.R.C. § 677 since it can result in taxa-
tion of income to a parent even if he or she was not the transferor of the property. Nevertheless, it 
represents the most authoritative guidance from the IRS in determining whether a payment to or 
for a minor child is in satisfaction of an obligation of support. 
79. See generally Nitzburg, The Obligation of Support: A Proposed Federal Standard, 23 
TAx L. REV. 93 (1967); Note, Federal Tax Aspects of the Obligation to Support, 74 HARV. L. 
REV. 1191 (1961). 
80. Although most states have not statutorily defined the elements of the parental support 
obligation, a few state statutes set out minimal amounts of support. See CAL. CJv. CODE § 4723 
(West Supp. 1988) (also lists specific items); CoLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-115 (1987) (also lists 
specific items); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 25-7-7 (Supp. 1987). 
All states have by statute provided for actions in which parental support obligations may be 
enforced in the context of a divorce, or otherwise. Most of the divorce statutes that describe child 
support obligations do not mention specific items. See ALA. CODE§ 30-3-1, II (Supp. 1987); ARIZ. 
REV. STAT. ANN.§ 25-320 (Supp. 1987); ARK. STAT. ANN.§ 9-12·312 (Supp. 1987); CONN. GEN. 
STAT. ANN.§ 46b-84 (1986); FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 61.13 (West Supp. 1987); IDAHO CODE§ 32-706 
(Supp. 1987); KY. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 403.210 (Baldwin 1983); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 208, § 
28 (West 1987); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 452.340 (Vernon 1986); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-204 
(1987); NEB. REV. STAT.§ 42-364 (1984); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 125.190 (Michie 1986); N.M. 
STAT. ANN. § 40-4-11 (1986); OHIO REv. CoDE ANN. § 3105.21 (Anderson Supp. 1986); OKLA. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1277 (West Supp. 1988); OR. REv. STAT.§ 107.105 (1983); PA. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 23, app. § 504 (Purdon Supp. 1987); R.I. GEN. LAWS§ 15-5-16.2 (Supp. 1987); S.C. CoDE 
ANN.§ 20-3-160 (Law. Co-op. 1985); TENN. CODE ANN.§ 36-6-101 (Supp. 1987); UTAH CODE 
ANN.§ 30-3-5 (Supp. 1987); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 659 (Supp. 1987); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 26.09.100 (1986); W.VA. CODE§ 48-2-15 (1986). 
A few divorce child-support statutes refer to education in a general way as part of the support 
obligation that may be imposed. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 458:17 (Supp. 1987); N.J. STAT. 
ANN.§ 2A:34-23 (West 1987); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw § 32 (McKinney Supp. 1988); N.D. CENT. 
CODE§ 14-05-22 (1981); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.§ 25-3-11 (1984). One such statute permits 
imposition of the costs of private schooling. See CoLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-115(13) (1987). An-
other refers to education of an adult child. See HAw. REv. STAT. § 580-47 (Supp. 1987). Yet 
another permits imposition of education costs beyond a child's twenty-first birthday. See IND. 
CODE ANN.§ 31-1-11.5-12(d)(l) (Burns Supp. 1987). 
In addition to the California and Colorado statutes cited above, statutes in Maine and Michi-
gan providing for orders of child support in divorce actions specify particular items that may be 
the subject of support orders. See ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 752(10) (Supp. 1987); MICH. 
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parent studies judicial glosses on state support statutes, it will often be 
difficult, because of the family's economic circumstances, to tell 
whether distributions of trust income for an expensive music camp or a 
child's automobile would represent a parental support obligation. 
Further, a parent may, in a separation agreement or agreement 
with a provider of services to a minor, assume a legally-enforceable 
obligation of support. The notion of a support obligation may thus be 
expanded to an almost unlimited degree. 
The surprisingly few decisions that have considered whether pay-
ments to or on behalf of dependent children represent a legal obligation 
of support under section 677(b) reflect not only the variations in state 
law, but also varying approaches of the courts in evaluating the federal 
tax implications of state law. 
Estate of Hamiel v. Commissione,.S1 took a rather restrictive view 
of what constitutes an obligation of support. In that case, as part of a 
divorce proceeding, the father of a ten-year-old child agreed to pay 
$115 per month to the child's mother for support of the child. In addi-
tion, the taxpayer and the child's mother conveyed their family home to 
the child, and the taxpayer also conveyed stock in trust for the child's 
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 552.16 (West Supp. 1987). 
Like the divorce child support statutes, most state statutes that describe or authorize imposi· 
tion of child support orders generally do not refer to specific items the cost of which may be 
imposed upon a parent as child support. For instance, the Utah child-support-obligation statute 
provides: "Every man shall support his child." UTAH CooE ANN.§ 78-45-3 (1977). The compara-
ble Virginia statute provides scant guidance with respect to the contours of this support obligation: 
"The court's decision shall be rendered based upon the evidence relevant to each individual case." 
VA. CODE ANN. § 20-108.1 (Supp. 1987). Most other such statutes are quite similar in their lack 
of particularity. See ALASKA STAT.§ 25-20-030 (1983); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 12-2451 (Supp. 
1987); CAL. Clv. CODE§ 196 (West 1982); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.§ 46b-215 (West 1986); DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 501 (1981); D.C. CODE ANN.§ 16-916 (1981); GA. CODE ANN.§ 19-11-43 
(1982); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, para. 505 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987); LA. C1v. CooE ANN. art. 
227 (West 1973); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 446 (1964); Mo. FAM. LAw CooE ANN.§ 12-
101 (1984); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 273, §I (West Supp. 1987); MINN. STAT. ANN.§ 257.66, 
subdiv. 3 (West Supp. 1988); Mo. ANN. STAT.§ 454.480 (Vernon 1986); NEv. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 
126.291 (Michie 1986); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 44:1-143 (West Supp. 1987); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-
13.4 (1987); OHIO REv. CODE ANN.§ 3103.03 (Anderson 1980); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 4 
(Supp. 1988); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, app. § 4322 (Purdon Supp. 1987); R.I. GEN. LAws§ 15-9-1 
(Supp. 1987); S.C. CooE ANN. § 20-3-160 (Law. Co-op. 19S5); TENN. CODE ANN. § 34-1-101 
(Supp. 1987); TEx. FAM. CooE ANN. § 4.02 (Vernon Supp. 1988); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 767.25 
(West Supp. 1987). 
A few such statutes refer to education in a general way. See, e.g., HAW. REv. STAT.§ 577-7 
(1985); IND. CODE ANN.§ 31-1-11.5-12(b) (Burns Supp. 1987); KAN. STAT. ANN.§ 60-1610 
(Supp. 1987); MONT. CODE ANN.§ 40-6-211 (1987); N.D. CENT. CODE§ 14-08.1-01 (Supp. 
1987); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 25-7-7 (Supp. 1987). A few more statutes list other specific 
items the cost of which may be imposed as part of a support obligation. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 
252A.4 (West 1985); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 552.451 (West Supp. 1987); N.Y. JUDICIARY 
LAW§ 416 (McKinney Supp. 1988); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.§ 26.18.020(2) (1986). 
81. 253 F.2d 787 (6th Cir. 1958). 
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benefit. After the death of the named trustee, the grantor-without any 
authority in the trust indenture-treated the income from the trust as 
personal income of his child for most of the first four tax-years of the 
trust.82 The Commissioner attempted to tax the income of the trust to 
the estate of the grantor. The income available to the child during the 
four tax-years involved was over $27,000. A substantial amount of this 
was used to make mortgage payments and to cover maintenance on the 
child's home. Although the Tax Court treated the trust as a sham,83 
the Sixth Circuit reversed this finding. 
The Sixth Circuit also rejected the finding of the Tax Court that 
the trust was created solely to enable the grantor (taxpayer) to satisfy 
his own obligations of support to his child. The appellate court deter-
mined that those obligations were discharged by the monthly payments 
of $115 to the child's mother. The court did not refer to state law to 
determine what constituted the taxpayer's obligation of support, but 
rather assumed that it would be preposterous to treat the amount of 
annual income of the trust, which averaged over $6,000, as support of 
the child: 
It was not necessary to use the total income of the trust each year for the 
support and education of the child. Such an expenditure would have 
been utterly foolish and a deliberate waste and destruction of what be-
longed to the child. No court of equity would have permitted such folly 
IU 
It would not be unreasonable to regard shelter as part of an obli-
gation of support for a child. The taxpayer in Estate of Hamiel was 
able to use trust income to provide shelter for his son. Conveying real 
estate to a ten year old may entail many complications, but in Estate 
of Hamiel, it helped to prevent payment of the mortgage on the child's 
home with trust income from being regarded as the discharge of an 
obligation of support of the grantor. This case demonstrates that a tax-
payer, in a divorce context, may fix by agreement a level of payments 
that represent support and maintenance. Payments in excess of that 
level may be regarded as representing something other than fulfillment 
of a legal obligation of support. The decision also demonstrates a fed-
eral court's flexibility in evaluating what constitutes a support obliga-
tion for tax purposes. 
In Brooks v. United States,8 ,. the taxpayer, a physician, deeded 
82. /d. at 789-90. 
83. See IRS v. Estate of Hamiel, 15 T.C.M. (CCH) 1225, 1233 (1956), rev"d, 253 F.2d 787 
(6th Cir. 1958). 
84. Estate of Hamiel, 253 F.2d at 792. 
85. 468 F.2d 1155 (9th Cir. 1972). 
22 UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW [VOL. 13:1 
real estate that included his medical. offices to his children. He was 
appointed their guardian and he collected rents from the building's te-
nants, including himself, for the benefit of his children. The income 
from the real estate was applied to the children's health insurance and 
education. The taxpayer also used income from the real estate for pri-
vate school tuition, musical instruments and swimming and public 
speaking lessons for the children. Taxpayer also purchased an automo-
bile for his oldest child and paid travel expenses to New Mexico for his 
asthmatic child.88 
The Ninth Circuit upheld the gift-leaseback arrangement that per-
mitted the taxpayer to deduct the rental payments he made to him-
self.87 The court also held that the taxpayer was not required to report 
income paid on behalf of his children because he was not required 
under Montana law to provid~ such benefits to his children.88 That 
finding is somewhat surprising in that Montana law provides that the 
parent entitled to custody of a child must give the child "support and 
education suitable to his circumstances."89 
Such judicial flexibility in defining obligations of support has 
sometimes cut against the taxpayer, however. In Morrill v. United 
States, 90 the taxpayer-grantor used income from a trust to pay tuition 
and room charges for four of his minor children at exclusive private 
secondary schools and colleges.91 The court held the income taxable to 
the grantor without reaching the issue of whether its use for private 
secondary and higher education represented discharge of a support ob~ 
ligation under Maine law.92 
The court held that although the taxpayer had not expressly as-
sumed responsibility for tuition and other charges at all of the schools 
involved,93 he had impliedly obligated himself to pay such charges. The 
conduct that, according to the court, created this implied obligation 
included approval of the taxpayer of their enrollment at the schools and 
his receipt of bills from the institutions. There was also no indication of 
86. /d. at 1157. 
87. Id. 
88. /d. 
89. 1947 MONT. REv. CoDES§ 61-104, amended, ch. 293, § 21, Laws 1975 (now codified at 
MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-211 (1985)). 
The Brooke court also brushed aside a Montana decision relied upon by the government, 
Refer v. Refer, 102 Mont. 121, 56 P.2d 750 (1936), as "entirely limited to its facts." Brooke, 468 
F.2d at 1158. Assuming such limitation, it is difficult to see how Refer would not control at least 
with respect to educational expenses. In that case a divorced father was ordered to pay $35 per 
month for the college education of his son. Refer, 102 Mont. at _, 56 P.2d at 752-53. 
90. 228 F. Supp. 734 (D. Me. 1964). 
91. /d. at 735. 
92. /d. 
93. In two instances the taxpayer had assumed such liability. /d. at 736. 
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any express agreements between the children and the schools.9" Since 
the payment of the school expenses was treated as payment of the 
grantor's (perhaps unintentionally) assumed obligations, it was treated 
as a distribution to the grantor under section 677(a)(l ).911 
In Braun v. Commissioner,96 the Tax Court held taxable to the 
grantor both payment of college tuition for his children over eighteen 
and payment of private high school tuition for his other children. With 
respect to college tuition, the Tax Court relied upon the New Jersey 
Supreme Court decision in Newburgh v. Arrigo,97 which involved an 
attempt by an adult son to obtain a distributive share of the proceeds of 
a wrongful death action prosecuted by his father's administratrix. 
While stating that "(g]enerally parents are not under a duty to support 
children after the age of majority,"98 the court held that "[i]n appro-
priate circumstances, parental responsibility includes the duty to assure 
children of a college and even of a postgraduate education such as law 
school."99 The court held that whether such an obligation existed would 
be determined by a twelve-part test.100 
Newburgh involved an estate dispute between the deceased's ad-
94. /d. at 737. 
95. Could a taxpayer avoid taxation to himself of distributions for the same purpose by 
being more careful not to assume such implied obligations? Yes, according to The United States 
Court of Claims in Wyche v. United States, 36 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) 11 75-5816 (Ct. Cl. 1974). In 
Wyche, private school tuition of a grantor's children was paid by a trust. The school made no 
contracts with parents concerning attendance. Tuition was payable in advance. The court held for 
the taxpayer, finding no obligation to provide such education under South Carolina law and no 
taxpayer-created implied obligation held so critical in Morrill. /d. 11 75-5820. 
It seems absurd that the same expenditure may be taxable or nontaxable to a grantor depend-
ing upon the arrangement with the school, but a comparison of Morrill and Wyche would seem to 
permit such an interpretation of the law. 
96. 48 T.C.M. (CCH) 210 (1984). 
97. 88 N.J. 529, 443 A.2d 1031 (1982). 
98. !d. at 543, 443 A.2d at 1038. 
99. !d. at 544, 443 A.2d at 1038. 
I 00. The factors in this test are: 
(I) whether the parent, if still living with the child, would have contributed toward the 
costs of the requested higher education; (2) the effect of the background, values and goals 
of the parent on the reasonableness of the expectation of the child for higher education; (3) 
the amount of the contribution sought by the child for the cost of higher education; ( 4) the 
ability of the parent to pay that cost; (5) the relationship of the requested contribution to 
the kind of school or course of study sought by the child; (6) the financial resources of both 
parents; (7) the commitment to and aptitude of the child for the requested education; (8) 
the financial resources of the child, including assets owned individually or held in custodi-
anship or trust; (9) the ability of the child to earn income during the school year or on 
vacation; (10) the availability of financial aid in the form of college grants and loans; (II) 
the child's relationship to the paying parent, including mutual affection and shared goals as 
well as responsiveness to parental advice and guidance; and ( 12) the relationship of the 
education requested to any prior training and to the overall long-range goals of the child. 
!d. at 545, 443 A.2d at 1038-39. 
24 UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW [VOL. 13:1 
ministratrix and the deceased's son by a former marriage. The Tax 
Court in Braun conceded that many aspects of Newburgh's twelve-part 
test would have no bearing outside such an adversarial situation.101 The 
Tax Court held, however, that · 
the import to our facts is clearly that petitioners retained the obligation 
to provide their children with a college education. They were both able 
and willing to do so, a college education was imminently [sic] reasonable 
in light of the background, values and goals of the parents as well as the 
children, and petitioners have brought forward no facts or arguments 
which would militate against the recognition of this obligation on the 
part of these particular parents.102 
The court found New Jersey law less clear with respect to the issue of 
private high school tuition as constituting an obligation of support but 
concluded that "it would be an anomaly to find a support obligation for 
college tuition for an emancipated child but none for private high 
school expense for a yourtger child in the same family."103 
The approach of the Tax Court in Braun is troublesome. The court 
was forced to apply state law in a situation somewhat different from 
the closest precedent. Application of state law itself raises questions 
about uniform application of the tax law throughout the United States. 
Whether a distribution from a trust for a particular purpose will consti-
tute fulfillment of a grantor's obligation of support will vary from juris-
diction to jurisdiction, although, with respect to higher education, it has 
been increasingly recognized as an obligation of support by state 
courts.104 Further, if the obligation of support is based, as it is in so 
many jurisdictions, upon the circumstances of the parents, having suffi-
cient accumulated wealth to place in trust will likely be regarded as a 
circumstance that warrants broad construction of the parental obliga-
tion of support. 
There is a surprisingly small amount of case law concerning what 
sort of distributions from a trust will be regarded as fulfilling an obliga-
tion of support of the grantor. Changes in the tax rates of trusts may 
encourage more distributions to minors over fourteen, thus generating 
much more litigation than has occurred in the past. In order to avoid a 
spate of decisions that examine the intricacies and variations of state 
statutes and case law, Congress should consider "federalizing" for tax 
analysis the notion of an obligation of support by, for example, provid-
101. Braun, 48 T.C.M. (CCH) at 213. 
102. /d. 
103. /d. 
I 04. Annotation, Responsibility of Noncustodial Divorced Parent to Pay for, or Contribute 
to, Costs of Child's College Education. 99 A.L.R.3o 322 (I 980); see also 59 AM. JuR. 2o Parent 
and Child§ 47 (1987). 
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ing that use of trust income for particular purposes will be deemed as 
fulfilling a grantor's obligation of support.106 
Until such an amendment is made, the changes wrought by the 
Act are likely to generate complexity and frustrate the objectives of tax 
reform. If the IRS and the courts view a parent's support obligation 
broadly, distributions from trusts to minors and other children over 
fourteen will not likely create a large loophole in the Act's restriction 
on the use of trusts to lower a family's total tax bill. Nevertheless, 
court decisions under the prior law do not provide any definite indica-
tion as to how broadly the parental obligation of support will be con-
strued in the future. 
III. EFFECTS ON OTHER FORMS AND MEANS OF INCOME SHIFTING 
One clear thrust of tax reform was against the use of trusts to shift 
income to minor family members. By taxing all unearned income of 
minors under fourteen at the tax rate of their. parents, the Act goes 
beyond even the generally more restrictive Treasury, Reagan, and 
House proposals, which would have limited such taxation to income 
from parental sources. The taxation at parental rates of unearned in-
come derived from property from grandparents, nonrelatives, or even 
from accumulated property representing prior earnings of the child is a 
dramatic change that may become even more dramatic if tax rates are 
eventually raised or made more progressive again. 
The Act's parental tax will affect two areas outside the trust attri-
bution sphere that have been the subject of specific legislative treat-
ment: family partnerships and S corporations. It will now be more diffi-
cult to shift income effectively in either situation. 
A. Family Partnerships 
Partnerships, which generally allocate the tax attributes among 
the partners, 106 have long presented an opportunity for shifting income 
within a family. A sole proprietor may form a partnership with his 
spouse and children, or with trusts in which such persons are the bene-
ficiaries, and allocate a significant portion of the income from the busi-
105. Such action would be similar to the adoption by Congress in the Tax Reform Act of 
1984 of a federal definition of alimony in§ 71(b)(l). One of the primary reasons for this change 
was the belief of Congress that "[d]ifferences in state laws create[d] differences in Federal tax 
consequences and administrative difficulties for the IRS." STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 
98TH CONG., 2D SESS., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT OF 1984, 714 
(Comm. Print 1984). The lack of uniformity of state laws with respect to what constitutes an 
obligation of support is likely to cause similar administrative difficulties for the IRS. 
106. I.R.C. § 704(a) provides: "A partner's dis.tributive share of income, gain, loss, deduc-
tion, or credit shall, except as otherwise provided in this chapter, be determined by the partnership 
agreement." 
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ness to the lower bracket "partners." 
Congress might have regarded such a situation as simply too good 
to be true, but it did not. In section 704(e)/07 Congress permitted tax-
payers to shift income by entering into a partnership with family mem-
bers under certain conditions. Section 704(e), part of the Revenue Act 
of 1951/08 was enacted largely in response to the judicial wake of 
Commissioner v. Culbertson, 109 and was generally intended to create a 
safe harbor for such arrangements without regard to the motives for 
which they are created.110 
The House report clearly indicates the tolerant spirit of section 
704(e): 
Many court decisions since . . . Culbertson . . . have held invalid for 
tax purposes family partnerships which arose by virtue of a gift of a 
partnership interest from one member of a family to another, where the 
donee performed no vital services for the partnership. Some of these 
cases apparently proceed upon the theory that a partnership cannot be 
valid for tax purposes unless the intrafamily gift of capital is motivated 
107. J.R.C. § 704(e) provides: 
(e) Family partnerships-
( I) Recognition of interest created by purchase or gift.-A person shall be rec-
ognized as a partner for purposes of this subtitle if he owns a capital interest in a 
partnership in which capital is a material income-producing factor, whether or not 
such interest was derived by purchase or gift from any other person. 
(2) Distributive share of donee includible in gross income.-In the case of any 
partnership interest created by gift, the distributive share of the donee under the 
partnership agreement shall be includible in his gross income, except to the extent 
that such share is determined without allowance of reasonable compensation for 
services rendered to the partnership by the donor, and except to the extent that the 
portion of such share attributable to donated capital is proportionately greater than 
the share of the donor attributable to the donor's capital. The distributive share of a 
partner in the earnings of the partnership shall not be diminished because of ab-
sence due to military service. 
(3) Purchase of interest by member of family.-For purposes of this section, an 
interest purchased by one member of a family from another shall be considered to 
be created by gift from the seller, and the fair market value of the purchased inter-
est shall be considered to be donated capital. The "family" of any individual shall 
include only his spouse, ancestors, and lineal descendants, and any trusts for the 
primary benefit of such persons. 
108. Revenue Act of 1951, ch. 521, § 191, 65 Stat. 452, 511 (1951) (codified at J.R.C. § 
704(e)(2)-(3)). 
109. 337 u.s. 733 (1949). 
II 0. Culbertson involved a rancher who "sold" interests totaling one-half of his business to 
his four sons. The sons "paid" for their interests with notes that were redeemed with income from 
the operations of the business as well as with gifts from the father. The Supreme Court ordered a 
remand of the case to the Tax Court, which had refused to give effect to the partnership for tax 
purposes, for consideration of whether there was a "bona fide intent" to create a partnership 
"either because of services to be performed ... or because of contributions of capital of which 
they were the true owners .... " /d. at 748. 
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by a desire to benefit the partnership business.m 
The legitimation of such shifting of income without regard to motive, 
or notwithstanding a patent tax-avoidance motive, is reminiscent of the 
spirit of the grantor-trust rules.112 
A partnership interest, whether created by purchase or gift, is rec-
ognized if the partner possesses a capital interest in a partnership in 
which capital is a material income-producing factor. 118 Regulations 
provide that capital is a material income-producing factor if "a sub-
stantial portion of the gross income of the business is attributable to the 
employment of capital in the business" but not "where the income of 
the business cbnsists principally of fees, commissions, or other compen-
sation for personal services performed by members or employees of the 
partnership. "114 The requirement that capital be a material income-
producing factor generally rules out attempts to shift income to minor 
children who are "partners" in professional partnerships.1111 
Section 704(e) requires that when the partnership interest has 
been created by gift, the distributive share of the donee must reflect 
both an allowance of reasonable compensation for the services of the 
donor to the partnership116 and the value of the donor's capital.117 
Finally, consistent with the intent of Congress that only bona fide 
transfers of partnership interests in a family setting be recognized for 
II I. H. REP. No. 586, 82d Cong., Jst Sess., 32-33 (1951). 
112. See, e.g., Stephenson Trust v. Comm'r, 81 T.C. 283 (1983) (discussed supra notes 
65-72 and accompanying text). 
113. I.R.C. § 704(e)(l). 
114. 'Treas. Reg.§ 1.704-J(e)(J)(iv) (1956). 
115. See Ketter v. Comm'r, 70 T.C. 637 (1978), aff'd, 605 F.2d 1209 (8th Cir. 1979) (un-
published order). In Ketter, the taxpayer, a CPA, performed services as a sole proprietor for a 
partnership composed of trusts for the benefit of his children and his alma mater. The court held 
that capital was not a material income-producing factor of the partnership. 70 T.C. at 664; see 
also Payton v. United States, 425 F.2d 1324 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 957 (1970). In 
Payton, the court rejected an income-shifting scheme by an ophthalmologist who placed his re-
lated optical company in a partnership in which he had donated interests to his children. Noting 
that at the time of the donation of the interests the business had inventory of $2,000 and non-
inventory assets of $752, the court held that capital was not an income-producing factor. /d. at 
1326-27. 
In Ketter, capital was insignificant as an income-producing factor when compared with the 
services of the donor-partner. But see Turner v. Comm'r, 24 T.C.M. (CCH) 544 (1965) (Tax 
Court found capital to be a material income-producing factor in a beer distributorship because its 
operations were funded with capital contributions and undistributed earnings); O'Donnell v. 
Comm'r, 23 T.C.M. (CCH) 210 (1964) (Tax Court made a similar finding on the basis that a 
partnership engaged as a manufacturer's representative for a woolens manufacturer used substan-
tial amounts of capital to pay employees, defray costs of promotions, and secure guarantees of 
customer accounts). 
116. See Gorrill v. Comm'r, 22 T.C.M. (CCH) 804 (1963). 
117. See I.R.C. § 704(e)(2). 
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tax purposes,118 the regulations require that the donee actually own the 
partnership interest.119 The tests for ownership are based upon the par-
ticular facts and circumstances,. the conduct of the parties, 120 and com-
pliance with state law for creation of an irrevocable gift. 121 
Factors in the regulations emphasize the degree of control allowed 
the donee in the management122 or conduct128 of the partnership busi-
ness in determining ownership of a partnership interest. Obviously a 
requirement that a donee of a partnership interest be recognized as, 
and participate as, an active partner in the partnership business would 
create insurmountable obstacles to recognition for tax purposes of the 
interests of young children; thus, the regulations provide that trust-
eesm or fiduciariesu& may exercise such control functions on behalf of 
the donee. In addition, limited partnership interests, even those of mi-
nor children, may be recognized if the limited partnership is "organized 
and conducted in accordance with the requirements of the applicable 
State limited-partnership law."126 
In the once much-litigated area of family partnerships, Congress 
and the IRS have created safe harbors for shifting of income within a 
family unit, even when such arrangements are for no other purpose 
118. See H. REP. No. 586, supra note 105, at 33. 
119. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-l(e)(l)(iii) (1956). 
120. /d. § 1.704-1 (e)(2)(i). 
121. /d. 
Manuel v. Comm'r, 45 T.C.M. (CCH) 981 (1983), demonstrates the need, for tax purposes, 
to respect both substance and form. In that case the taxpayer was a widow who had inherited in 
fee a one-half interest in a farm and a usufruct (life estate) interest in the other one-half. She 
"donated" one-half of the crops of the farm in the years involved to her children. Substantively, 
she retained tacit power to determine which crops every year would be subject to the donation, 
how much money each child would receive, and how such money would be spent. The taxpayer 
was also not attentive to formal matters as she did not actually surrender the usufruct interest to 
the children, nor did she file partnership returns for the years involved. The court disregarded the 
donation of the partnership interests for tax purposes. /d. 
122. Treas. Reg.§ 1-704-1(e)(2)(ii)(d) (1956). 
123. /d. § 1.704-l (e)(2)(vi). 
124. /d. § 1.704-1 (e)(2)(vii). 
125. /d. § 1.704-1(e)(2)(viii). 
126. /d.§ 1.704-1(e)(2)(ix). In Garcia v. Comm'r, 48 T.C.M. (CCH) 425 (1984), the prin-
cipal partnership business was the operation of a store that sold groceries, hardware, clothing, and 
building materials. The court found that management of the business by the general partner-
donor, father of the limited partners, was consistent with normal practice in limited partnerships 
and did not require a finding that the children were not the true owners of their limited partner-
ship interests. /d. at 436. The mother of the children had been appointed as their guardian and 
although the court opined that a more qualified guardian could have been chosen, it nevertheless 
respected the limited partnership interests of the children for tax purposes. /d. 
But see Pflugradt v. United States, 310 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1962) (limited partnership inter-
ests of very young grandchildren of the donor-general partner were not respected for tax purposes 
because no trustee or fiduciary subject to judicial supervision had been appointed to supervise the 
interests of the minors during the tax-years involved). 
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than shifting income. Enactment of the parental tax disrupts this safe 
harbor with respect to children under fourteen, assuming that the part-
nership income of such children will ordinarily be unearned. However, 
it is not clear that the committees of Congress regarded use of a family 
partnership to lower a family's total tax bill as an evil that needed to be 
remedied.127 While the Reagan128 and Treasury129 proposals did equate 
partnerships and S corporations with trusts for tax-avoidance purposes, 
both proposals viewed them as mere receptacles of income-producing 
property. Moreover, bringing even a young child into a viable family 
partnership business may involve a great deal more than simple shifting 
of income. 
In the wake of the Act, parents who contemplate admitting their 
children to partnerships will not have as much of a tax incentive to act 
until such children are fourteen years old. While, as discussed earlier, 
with respect to property other than partnership interests, a parent may 
be inclined to place property in trust for a minor and allow the trust to 
accumulate the income until the child beneficiary is fourteen, a donor 
of a partnership interest who wishes to use a trust to avoid the parental 
tax must bear in mind that the regulations permitting recognition of a 
trustee as a partner may also lead to heightened tax scrutiny of the 
trust. In addition, if the donor-partner or someone amenable to his or 
her will is the trustee, the actions of the trustee will be scrutinized to 
determine whether they are consistent with ownership by the benefi-
ciary-a prerequisite for recognition of the partnership.130 Assuming 
127. In discussing the proposal to tax income of minors at the tax rate of their parents 
neither the Senate report nor the House report specifically discuss partnership interests. See S. 
REP. No. 313, supra note 19, at 862; H. REP. No. 426, supra note 18, at 800. 
128. REAGAN PROPOSAL, supra note 17, at 84. 
129. TREASURY PROPOSAL, supra note 16, at 92. 
130. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1 (e)(2)(vii) provides: 
(vii) Trustees as partners. A trustee may be recognized as a partner for income tax 
purposes under the principles relating to family partnerships generally as applied to the 
particular facts of the trust-partnership arrangement. A trustee who is unrelated to and 
independent of the grantor, and who participates as a partner and receives distribution of 
the income distributable to the trust, will ordinarily be recognized as the legal owner of the 
partnership interest which he holds in trust unless the grantor has retained controls incon-
sistent with such ownership. However, if the grantor is the trustee, or if the trustee is 
amenable to the will of the grantor, the provisions of the trust instrument (particularly as 
to whether the trustee is subject to the responsibilities of a fiduciary), the provisions of the 
partnership agreement, and the conduct of the parties must all be taken into account in 
determining whether the trustee in a fiduciary capacity has become the real owner of the 
partnership interest. Where the grantor (or person amenable to his will) is the trustee, the 
trust may be recognized as a partner only if the grantor (or such other person) in his 
participation in the affairs of the partnership actively represents and protects and interests 
of the beneficiaries in accordance with the obligations of a fiduciary and does not 
subordinate such interests to the interests of the grantor. Furthermore, if the grantor (or 
person amenable to his will) is the trustee, the following factors will be given particular 
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that the trustee-partner must act in the interest of the beneficiary-part-
ner, the action of the trustee in withholding income to serve the tax-
avoidance needs of the donor-while permitted under the grantor-trust 
rules181-might be regarded as a conflict that would vitiate the partner-
ship for tax purposes. Even if the tax-avoidance motive were viewed as 
in the best interest of the beneficiary-partner, such a motive might not 
be seen as possessing sufficient economic significance to be respected 
for tax purposes.182 It is clear, however, that as to children under four-
teen, the usefulness of the family partnership as an income shifting tool 
has been significantly lessened. 
B. S Corporations 
A corporation that elects under I.R.C. § 1362 to be an S Corpora-
tion188 is generally not subject to tax.184 Rather, items of income, loss, 
deduction, or credit must be taken into account by the shareholders in 
proportion to the amount of stock they hold in the corporation.1811 The 
absence of taxation at the entity level and the pass-through to share-
holders of tax attributes inS corporations are similar, of course, to the 
tax treatment of partnerships. 
S corporations also possess the same opportunity for shifting in-
come that exists with partnerships. Stock in an S corporation, like a 
partnership interest, may be given to a family member. Under section 
1366, such a donee would quite mechanically account for the tax at-
tributes of the corporation. 
In addition, Subchapter S has a provision that parallels section 
704(e), the family partnership provision. Under section 1366(e), if an 
individual who is a member of a family186 of one or more shareholders 
of an S corporation renders services to the corporation or furnishes cap-
ital without receiving adequate compensation therefor, the IRS may 
make adjustments to distributable items of the corporation to reflect 
reasonable compensation to the person rendering services or donating 
consideration: 
(a) Whether the trust is recognized as a partner in business dealings with cus-
tomers and creditors, and 
(b) Whether, if any amount of the partnership income is not properly retained 
for the reasonable needs of the business, the trust's share of such amount is distrib-
uted to the trust annually and paid to the beneficiaries or reinvested with regard 
solely to the interests of the beneficiaries. 
131. I.R.C. § 674(b)(6) (1988). 
132. See, e.g., Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361 (1960). 
133. Subchapter S of the Internal Revenue Code comprises I.R.C. §§ 1361-1379. 
134. I.R.C. § 1363(a) (1988). 
135. /d. § 1366(a)(l ). 
136. Section 704(e)(3) defines "family" as one's spouse, ancestors, lineal descendants, and 
any trusts for the primary benefit of such persons. 
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capital.187 Decisions under this provision indicate that where services 
rendered by a donor-shareholder are significant, a reallocation of in-
come by the IRS is likely to be sustained.188 On the other hand, when 
the donor has not performed services for the corporation on a substan-
tial or full-time basis, the IRS has had difficulty in sustaining realloca-
tions of income. 189 
The family reallocation provision of Subchapter S is simpler than 
section 704(e) because it does not contain the explicit requirement that 
capital be a material income-producing factor ir:t the business. Regula-
tions promulgated under former section 1373140-which have not been 
replaced-provide that a donee or purchaser of stock in a corporation is 
not considered to be shareholder unless "such stock is acquired in a 
bona fide transaction and the donee or purchaser is the real owner of 
such stock. nut The regulations also provide that transactions between 
members of a family will be closely scrutinized. u:a These regulations 
are similar to those under section 704, and problems involving the eco-
nomic reality of transfers of S corporation stock have generated case 
law similar to that under section 704(e).us 
In the Subchapter S Revision Act of 1982,144 the provision of for-
mer law that called for termination of S corporation status if a corpora-
tion had more than twenty percent of its· gross receipts from passive 
investment income1411 was modified substantially.149 The liberalization 
137. /d. § 1366(e). 
138. See Roob v. Comm'r, 50 T.C. 891 (1968); Krahenbuhl v. Comm'r, 27 T.C.M. (CCH) 
155 (1968). 
139. See, e.g .. Trucks, Inc. v. United States, 84-1 U.S.T.C. § 9418 (D. Neb. Apr. 3, 1984), 
affd, 763 F.2d 339 (8th Cir. 1985); Davis v. Comm'r, 64 T.C. 1034 (1975); Rocco v. Comm'r, 57 
T.C. 826 (1972). 
140. Now codified at I.R.C. § 1366. 
141. Treas. Reg. § 1.1373-I(a)(2) (1960). 
142. /d. 
143. See, e.g., Bierne v. Comm'r, 52 T.C. 210 (1969); Duarte v. Comm'r, 44 T.C. 193 
(1965). The decision in Bierne was distilled into four factors in Mintz & Braddock, Gifts of Sub 
S Stock and Loans from Short-Term Trusts Are Two Effective Ways to Shift Income, 56 J. 
T AX'N 228 (1982), as follows: 
/d. 
I. The extent to which the minor shareholders possess effective ownership rights in the 
shares; 
2. The extent to which the taxpayer-transferor ex~rcises dominion and control over the 
transferred shares; 
3. The extent to which the taxpayer-transferor retains the economic enjoyment of the 
transferred shares; 
4. The extent to which the taxpayer-transferor deals at arm's length with the corporation in 
transactions following the stock transfers. 
144. Pub. L. No. 97-354, 96 Stat. 1669. 
145. I.R.C. § 1372(e)(5) (1954), amended by I.R.C. § 1362(d)(3) (1982). 
146. Under I.R.C. § 1362(d)(3), an S corporation's status is terminated only if it has pas-
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of the passive income rule opened up the possibility of resort to the S 
corporation as an alternative to the trust for shifting investment in-
come.147 As it would in the context of family partnerships, the parental 
tax would frustrate the use of donations of S corporation stock to shift 
income to children under fourteen. Such unearned income would be 
taxed at the rate of the parents. 
Unlike partnership interests or other income-producing property, S 
corporation stock could not efficaciously be conveyed in trust for a child 
under fourteen with income to be accumulated until the child reached 
fourteen .• While S corporation stock may be held by a qualified sub-
chapter S trust, or by a trust in which a person may vest the trust's 
income or corpus in himself or herself during the taxable year,148 all of 
such trust's income is required to be distributed currently to the indi-
vidual beneficiary.149 Moreover, in either case the income taxed to the 
minor beneficiary would be at the tax rate of the parents. 
In sum, whether or not Congress really intended to do so, it has 
diminished the tax advantages of admitting minors under fourteen to 
an S corporation. 
IV. AN EvALUATION 
Did the Act bring reform with respect to income shifting? The 
elimination of the Clifford trust was a dramatic gesture. It removed one 
of the most popular, but also one of the most unfair, tax avoidance 
devices in the Code. Taxpayers seeking to shift income to children or 
grandchildren may continue to do so, but they must, for the most part, 
give up hope of getting such property back. 
The parental tax on all unearned income of children under four-
teen is also a dramatic gesture because it goes beyond what was in-
tended by tax reformers initially. Because it is not limited to parental-
source income, it will significantly diminish the usefulness for tax pur-
poses of the Uniform Gift to Minors Act for donors other than parents. 
Whether it is justifiable to tax income from gifts from such donors at 
the rate of the donee's parents is questionable. 
sive investment income of more than 25% of its gross receipts for each of three consecutive years 
and it has Subchapter C earnings at the end of each of those three years. 
Under § 1362(d)(3)(D), "passive investment income" is gross receipts from royalties, rents, 
dividends, interest, annuities, and sales or exchanges of stock or securities. 
147. See Gerhard & Walker, The New and Improved Subchapter S Corporation, 122 TR. 
& EsT. 44 (1983); Kaney, New Tax Law Opens the Door to Gifts of Subchapter S Stock in Trust 
to Minors, 8 EsT. PLAN. 343 (1981); Committee on Pre-Death Estate Planning, Estate Planning 
After /982 for the Subchapter S Shareholder, 17 REAL PROP .. PROB. & TR. J. 724 (1982). 
148. See I.R.C. § 136l(c)(2)(A)(I). Under § 678, this would preclude accumulation of 
income in the trust. 
149. /d. § 1361(d)(3)(B). 
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The parental tax will discourage resort to trusts to shift income, at 
least as to children under fourteen. Ultimately, however, the separate 
treatment of the trust as a tax entity, the real engine of intrafamily tax 
avoidance, has been left intact. To some extent, the trust may be used 
to undermine the parental tax. A measure of additional fairness has 
perhaps been achieved, but added complexity in the law will surely re-
sult as planners adapt the trust and other aspects of existing law to the 
parental tax. 
